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These articles and associated links are provided as items of general interest and are made available for the
purpose of peer review and discussion, as well as to promote critical thinking. This document is primarily
produced for educational purposes for courses taught by CIWAG faculty. Selection of articles should not
be construed as an explicit or implicit endorsement of particular publications, or the authors' or publisher's
views or interpretations. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, the
Naval War College, or CIWAG. The links embedded within this PDF may direct you to websites not
controlled by the Naval War College or the Department of Defense and should not be construed as
endorsement of those websites. Any questions should be directed to ciwag@usnwc.edu.
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Boko Haram
Origins and History
HISTORY OF THE COUNTRY AND ITS C ONNECTIONS TO BOKO HARAM
Felter, Claire. "Nigeria’s Battle with Boko Haram." Council on Foreign Relations. August 8,
2018. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/nigerias-battle-boko-haram.
This article is an overview of Boko Haram’s operations, territorial control, allegiances,
and socioeconomic impact on Northern Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region. The article
covers its growth and evolution since its creation in 2002, and the steps taken by Nigerian
and partner counterterrorism forces to disrupt Boko Haram operations during this time.
"Nigeria Profile - Timeline." BBC News, February 26, 2018.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13951696.
The BBC’s Nigerian country timeline lists key events in the country’s history and
provides context with regards to the rise of Boko Haram.
John Hare. “How Northern Nigeria's Violent History Explains Boko Haram.” National
Geographic, March 14, 2015.
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/03/150314-boko-haram-nigeria-borno-rabihabubakar-shekau/
This Nat Geo article was written by a British colonial official. He explains how the
history of violence in northern Nigeria has led to the brutality put forth by Boko Haram.
This type of radical fundamentalist violence has been occurring for many years prior to
the official existence of Boko Haram. It provides a history of north Nigerian conflict.
Ford, John. “The Origins of Boko Haram.” The National Interest, June 6, 2014.
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-origins-boko-haram-10609
This article points out that Boko Haram traces its roots in northern Nigeria to over ten
years. It describes the group’s origins as going all the way back to an anti-Western radical
preacher named Mohammed Marwa. The group’s ideology is derived from the antiwestern culture preaching’s of Mohammed Marwa and how his followers began
dissenting against the government in the town of Kano. The article provides excellent
information on the topic.
OVERVIEW
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"Nigeria: Extremism & Counter-Extremism." Counter Extremism Project. Fall 2018.
https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/nigeria.
The Counter-Extremism Project’s Nigerian Country Profile provides a holistic analysis of
Nigerian extremist groups and regional counterterrorism efforts. The overview also has a
tracker of major incidents and domestic counter-extremism operations and policy
initiatives.
"Boko Haram." Stanford University - Mapping Militant Organizations. August 26, 2016.
http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/553.
Provides a detailed brief about the group’s operations, leadership, goals, and history. The
Militant Map also shows the groups relationship with other militant organizations such as
al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.
Sreenivasan, Hari., and Nick Schifrin. “Poverty, Corruption Fuel Boko Haram in Nigeria.” PBS,
November 29, 2015.
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/poverty-corruption-fuels-boko-haram-in-nigeria/
This video presentation and accompanying transcript looks at several of the issues that
Nigeria is facing, and how they are impacting the population there. Boko Haram is a
serious threat and according to the article they have killed more people than the Islamic
State. In addition to the attacks of Boko Haram, Nigeria is dealing with high levels of
corruption and widespread poverty despite growing wealth and an expanding middle
class. There are also concerns regarding human rights issues and fair treatment of its
citizens.
“Who are Boko Haram? Explained in 60 seconds.” YouTube Video. 1:04. Posted by “BBC
News.” April 19, 2014.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DqRlcrqU3-A
This is a brief BBC video providing a general overview of Boko Haram.
Forest, James. “Confronting the terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria.” Joint Special
Operations University. May 2012. http://www.jamesforest.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/Boko_Haram_JSOU-Report-2012.pdf
A 178-page JSOU report on the armed group, accessible online and in-print (multiple
copies are available in CIWAG). It provides an overview of modern Nigerian political
history, Boko Haram grievances, and the implications of the insurgency for SOF.
Goals/Strategy
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ATTACKS

Wilson, Mark. "Nigeria's Boko Haram Attacks in Numbers - as Lethal as Ever." BBC News,
January 25, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42735414.
This article by the BBC provides infographics, maps, and charts derived through
statistical analysis of Boko Haram activity in 2016 and 2017. Despite the Nigerian
government’s public claims of progress and its near defeat of Boko Haram, in 2017,
Boko Haram was able to maintain or increase its levels of activity in most regions of
Northeastern Nigeria.
Ashkenas, Jeremy, Derek Wakins and Archi Tse. “Boko Haram: The Other Islamic State.” New
York Times, January 15, 2015.
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/12/11/world/africa/boko-haram-nigeriamaps.html
This link contains maps that showcase Boko Haram’s fight against the Nigerian military.
It also mentions 4 critical stages of violent activity.
OVERVIEW OF THREAT LEVEL TO U.S.

“Boko Haram Growing Threat to the U.S. Homeland.” U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Homeland Security. September 13, 2013.
https://homeland.house.gov/boko-haram-growing-threat-us-homeland/
This is a House Homeland Security Committee report on the potential threat Boko poses
to the U.S. homeland. It discusses in a detailed manner Boko’s potential to go
international, its connection to Al Qaeda, the Nigerian offensive, etc. The link leads to the
website with the PDF.
U.S. House. Committee on Homeland Security. Boko Haram – Emerging
Threat to the U.S. Homeland. November 30, 2011.
http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=693041
A congressional hearing on the threat the group poses to the U.S. Looks at its origins and
evolution, its tactics and collaboration with other armed groups, and its communications
and media strategies. Also considers US options for engagement.
OVERVIEW OF RECRUITING AND FINANCING

Foote, Willy. "Meet The Nigerian Entrepreneur Depriving Boko Haram Of New Recruits."
Forbes. May 30, 2018. https://www.forbes.com/sites/willyfoote/2018/05/30/meet-thenigerian-entrepreneur-depriving-boko-haram-of-new-recruits/#71f4b0d345b8.
Analysis of extremist groups often focuses on their ideologies, but the study of regional
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economic factors is equally important in understanding how these groups operate.
Disenfranchised youths are the demographic most vulnerable to radicalization and
recruitment - extremist groups give them a place to go when they have no other options.
Forbes interviews a Nigerian entrepreneur who focuses on developing agricultural
communities to employ local young people and keep them out of the hands of terrorist
organizations.
"Motivations and Empty Promises: Voices of Former Boko Haram Combatants and Nigerian
Youth." Mercy Corp. April 2016. https://www.mercycorps.org/research/motivations-andempty-promises-voices-former-boko-haram-combatants-and-nigerian.
The Mercy Corp spoke with 47 former members of Boko Haram, community members
living under Boko Haram’s rule, and youths that were in their sphere of influence but did
not join the group to ascertain how Boko Haram recruits its members and interacts with
the community. The key findings from these interviews revealed that there was no typical
demographic profile for Boko Haram recruits, and many joined because they perceived
Boko Haram as providing more opportunity for long-term financial security and business
growth than through other means.
Zenn, Jacob. “Boko Haram: Recruitment, Financing, and Arms Trafficking in the Lake Chad
Region.” CTC Sentinel. Vol.7. Is10. Combating Terrorism Center. October 2014.
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/boko-haram-recruitment-financing-and-arms-traffickingin-the-lake-chad-region
This is a report by the Combating Terrorism Center specific to Boko Haram activity in
the Lake Chad region. It provides excellent discussion on the group’s financing,
recruitment, and arms trafficking in the area.
Looney, Robert. The Boko Haram Economy. Foreign Policy, July 15, 2014.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/15/the-boko-haram-economy/
This article observes how the development deficiencies in Nigeria serve to support Boko.
It argues that the government must address these economic problems in order to defeat
the group.
Dixon, R. "Nigeria Reports Arrest of Female Recruiters for Boko Haram.” LA Times, July 4,
2014.
http://www.latimes.com/world/africa/la-fg-nigeria-boko-haram-20140704-story.html
This article points out that Nigerian officials have announced the existence of a female
wing of Boko Haram. Authorities also released photos of some prominent female
recruiters.
7|Page

OVERVIEW OF SECURITY THREATS TO THE AREA

Campbell, John. "Nigeria Security Tracker." Council on Foreign Relations. June 12, 2018.
https://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/p29483.
The Nigerian Security Tracker catalogues data from extremist violence in the region in a
series of maps, graphs, and charts to provide an easily digestible and visual representation
of the security situation in Nigeria. The data that is primarily displayed in the data set
demonstrates the magnitude of fatalities as a result of Niger Delta and Lake Chad region
militants.
Opperman, Jasmine, and Veryan Khan. "2016 TRAC African Threat Assessment." Terrorism
Research and Analysis Consortium. 2016.
https://www.trackingterrorism.org/article/2016-trac-african-threat-assessment.
TRAC provides an assessment of violent extremism in Africa and breaks down the
impact of armed groups on African states. In Africa, Boko Haram is responsible for more
violent events than any other group, resulting in over 10,000 deaths in 2015 alone.
FOREIGN FIGHTERS

Zenn, Jacob. "Boko Haram’s Senegalese Foreign Fighters: Cases, Trends and Implications."
Jamestown Foundation. May 4, 2018. https://jamestown.org/program/boko-haramssenegalese-foreign-fighters-cases-trends-and-implications/.
Cases, Trends and Implications: CIWAG case study author Jacob Zenn
examines Boko Haram’s Senegalese network to evaluate how extremism is growing in
Africa's Sahel. So far, 29 Senegalese citizens have been arrested on charges related to
supporting Boko Haram, and these case studies provide key insights into the network’s
operations.
Payne, Julia. “Exclusive: Captured Video Appears to Show Foreign Fighters in Nigeria’s Boko
Haram.” Reuters, May 26, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/26/us-nigeriaviolence-foreign-idUSKBN0OB1RR20150526
This article highlights footage found in captured Boko Haram camps by Nigeria’s
military show the influence of foreign fighters in the Islamist militant group’s leadership.
This provides the clearest indication to support the claim that Boko Haram has been
receiving outside support in its six year-long insurgency.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

Stevenson, John. “Statistical Analysis of Event Data Concerning Boko Haram in Nigeria.”
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. January
2015.
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https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_SMAAFRICOM_StatisticalAnalysis_Jan2015.pdf
This statistical analysis study was carried out by START. It contains a variety of statistics
on Boko as of 2013.
Allen, Nathaniel., Peter Lewis, and Hillary Matfess. “The Boko Haram Insurgency, by the
Numbers.” Washington Post, October 6, 2014.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/10/06/the-boko-haraminsurgency-by-the-numbers/
This article contains various figures regarding the Boko insurgency up until 2014. It also
provides some basic information on the group.

Leadership
ABU BAKAR SHEKAU
"Abubakar Shekau." Counter Extremism Project. 2018.
https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/abubakar-shekau.
This backgrounder on the Emir of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekakau, provides an
overview of Shekakau’s life, and his road to becoming the leader of Boko Haram in the
Yobe State.
“Boko Haram Says Leader Abubakar Shekau is Alive in New Video.” NDTV, October 8, 2015
http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/boko-haram-says-leader-abubakar-shekau-is-alive-innew-video-1229566
This article discusses how Abubakar Shekau has been rumored to be dead for the past
few months. However, in a video published in October several Boko members stated that
he was still alive. They also re-pledged their allegiance to ISIL.
“Boko Haram: Who is Abubakar Shekau?” YouTube Video. 2:31. Posted by “BBC News.” June
27, 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DnQ1tVIr8vk
This video claims to interview individuals who knew Abu Bakar Shekau. It contains brief
interview excerpts.
OTHER LEADERSHIP
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OVERVIEW

“Leadership Analysis of Boko Haram and Ansaru in Nigeria.” CTC Sentinel 7, no 2. Combating
Terrorism Center at West Point. (February 2014).
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/leadership-analysis-of-boko-haram-and-ansaru-in-nigeria
This report by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point analyzes the leadership of
Boko Haram as well as its breakaway faction, Ansaru. It examines rifts between the
leaders.
ABU QAQA-BH SPOKESMAN

Campbell, John. “The Guardian on Boko Haram.” Council on Foreign Relations. January 30,
2012. http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2012/01/30/the-guardian-on-boko-haram/
A summary of a British newspaper’s 2012 interview with Boko Haram spokesman, Abu
Qaqa. Includes links to the original piece, as well as other Guardian reports on the armed
group.
BOKO HARAM F RACTIONALIZATION & LEADERSHIP CHANGES
Zenn, Jacob, and John Campbell. "Boko Haram Leader Shekau's Book Helps Explain Factional
Rifts." Council on Foreign Relations. September 25, 2018.
https://www.cfr.org/blog/boko-haram-leader-shekaus-book-helps-explain-factional-rifts.
Abubaker Shekau released a book providing the direction and history of Nigerian jihad
from the perspective of Boko Haram. The book was released in response to works
published by other Islamist groups in the region: Ansaru and Abu Mus’b al-Barnawi’s
Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA). Shekau’s book provides insight to his theology and
perspective on Nigerian politics and how the Islamic caliphate should be run. The article
and counter narratives provide a unique perspective to the divide between the three major
groups in Nigeria.




Read the English translation of Abubaker Shekau’s book here.
Read the English translation of Abu Mus’ab al-Barnawi’s history “The Islamic
State West Africa Province vs. Abu Bakr Shekau” here.
Read the publication of Ansaru’s history here.

Trofimov, Yaroslav. “Behind Boko Haram’s Split: A Leader too Radical for Islamic State.” Wall
Street Journal, September 15, 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/behind-boko-haram-ssplit-a-leader-too-radical-for-islamic-state-1473931827
ISIL’s biggest and deadliest franchise outside the Middle East, Boko Haram, fractured in
recent weeks over ISIL’s decision to replace its notorious leader, Abubakar Shekau. This
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split, while weakening Boko Haram in the immediate term, could have dramatic
consequences for how jihadists continue their struggle in Nigeria and in neighboring
countries.
Gaffey, Conor. “What We Know about Boko Haram’s Factional War,” Newsweek, September 9,
2016. http://www.newsweek.com/boko-haram-isis-abubakar-shekau-abu-musab-albarnawi-496615
In the summer of 2016, Boko Haram split into two groups that have at times clashed with
each other. One of the groups remains adhered to Abubakar Shekau, who was Boko
Haram’s leader since 2009 and the other group follows Abu Musab al-Barnawi who has
been recognized by ISIS as the leader of the group. Under Shekau’s leadership, Boko
Haram kidnapped almost 300 schoolgirls and would regularly use them to carry out
suicide attacks. Attacks would be carried out against any soft target regardless of its
affiliation or significance. Barnawi’s faction more closely adheres itself to ISIS and sees
itself as representing the Islamic State West Africa Province. This faction seeks to only
target Christians and follow what it refers to as “true jihad.” The two factions have fought
each other regarding their tactics and end goals.

Major Attacks
ATTACKS IN NIGERIA
KIDNAPPING OF SCHOOL GIRLS

Matfess, Hilary. "Boko Haram Has Kidnapped More Girls. Here’s What We Know." Washington
Post, March 8, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2018/03/08/boko-haram-has-kidnapped-more-girls-heres-what-we-know/.
A recent abduction of over 100 schoolgirls in Dapachi, sheds light on the group’s
reasoning and practice of conducting mass kidnappings. Some estimates suggest that the
group has also abducted nearly 10,000 boys, who frequently join Boko Haram’s ranks as
child soldiers. Women, who become radicalized by the group and join of their own free
will, or are forced to join the group serve a variety of different roles in Boko Haram.
Many contribute by serving as recruiters or assist in the group’s logistics, while others
become fighters or suicide bombers, participating in kinetic attacks against the
government or dissenters.
Burke, Jason. “Third of Students Abducted by Boko Haram ‘Unwilling to Leave Captors.’”
Guardian, October 18, 2016.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2016/oct/17/nigerian-girls-kidnapped-byboko-haram-reunite-with-families-video
11 | P a g e

The Nigerian government is in the process of negotiating for release of 83 of the
schoolgirls taken by Boko Haram from Chibok in 2014. Boko Haram released 21 of the
abducted girls previously yet there is an even larger group that does not want to leave. It
is possible that not only have they been brainwashed during their captivity but also are
afraid of the potential for being ostracized and the stigma placed upon them by their
communities if they return.
Sieff, Kevin. “Boko Haram Militants Free 21 Captive Chibok Schoolgirls amid talks with
Nigeria.” Washington Post, October 13, 2016.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/boko-haram-militants-free-21-captive-chibokschoolgirls-amid-talks-with-nigeria/2016/10/13/9e94610a-0ed3-4a26-96f16c5d7cccfdcd_story.html
The Nigerian government was able to negotiate the release of 21 of the almost 300
abducted schoolgirls from Boko Haram. With Boko Haram splitting into two factions,
negotiations have been more difficult and the government is concerned that the captured
girls may be spread out amongst different areas that Boko Haram controls.
Abubakar, Aminu. “As Many as 200 Girls Abducted by Boko Haram, Nigerian Officials Say.”
CNN, April 16, 2014.
http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/15/world/africa/nigeria-girls-abducted/index.html
This article is on the news coverage regarding the mass kidnapping of more than 200
schoolgirls from Chibok, close to the border with Cameroon. The article also points out
that many schools across Northern Nigeria have been closed due to fear of Boko attacks.
COLLECTION OF ATTACKS

"Timeline of Boko Haram Insurgency In Nigeria: From the First Attack In 2009 Till Now."
Gabardi. January 25, 2018. http://gbaradi.com/culture/timeline-of-boko-haraminsurgency-in-nigeria/.
Nonpartisan Nigerian blog that lists Boko Haram’s attacks and major operations from
2009 through January 2017.
“Boko Haram Attack Caps Week of Bloodshed in Nigeria.” BBC News, July 5, 2015.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33401810
This article recaps a week of violence by Boko Haram which killed over 200 people
during Ramadan. While the regional coalition has retaken most of the territory from the
insurgent group, northeastern Nigeria is still prone to consistent, high-casualty attacks.
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“A Year of Attacks Linked to Nigeria's Boko Haram.” CNN, February 27, 2014.
http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/27/world/africa/nigeria-year-of-attacks/?hpt=bosread
This is a CNN link that provides summaries to the major Boko attacks of 2013 and some
in early 2014. The link also contains video footage of some of the major attacks through
this time.
BORNO VILLAGE ATTACK

Varandi, Suman. “Boko Haram Insurgency: 56 Killed By Islamic Extremist Group in Nigeria's
Borno State.” International Business Times, August 31, 2015.
http://www.ibtimes.com/boko-haram-insurgency-56-killed-islamic-extremist-groupnigerias-borno-state-2074726
This article points out how Boko attacked a village in Borno, killing 56 people. The
article cites the state’s governor as saying that Boko Haram is a threat to both Christians
and Muslims.
ABUJA ATTACKS

Akinwotu, Emmanuel, and Aurelien Breeden. "‘Shocked’ by Attack on Mosque, Nigeria
Tightens Security in Northeast." New York Times, May 2, 2018.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/02/world/africa/nigeria-boko-haram-terrorismattacks.html.
Coordinated suicide bomb attacks by Boko Haram members at a mosque and market in
the Abuja province left at least 30 people dead. The attacks occurred during afternoon
prayer and was the largest magnitude attack of its type in the Abuja province since 2015.
The attack underscores the ability of Boko Haram to invest minimal human and material
resources to disrupt state operations and the lives of civilians in Northeastern Nigeria.
“Boko Haram Suspected after Nigerian Capital Abuja hit by Bomb Blasts.” Guardian,
October 2, 2015.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/03/boko-haram-suspected-after-nigeriancapital-abuja-hit-by-bomb-blasts
This article discusses another major Boko attack that occurred recently in October of
2015. The article points out that well over 1,000 people died from May to October 2015.
Since 2009, 2.5 million people have been displaced due to the fighting.
BAGA ATTACK

Abubakar, Aminu, and Faith Karimi. “2,000 feared killed in 'deadliest' Boko Haram attack in
Nigeria.” CNN, January 12, 2015.
http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/09/africa/boko-haram-violence/
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This article discusses one of the deadliest Boko attacks that left up to 2,000 people dead.
The attack occurred over multiple days.
INCREASED USE OF SUICIDE BOMBINGS

Searcey, Dionne. "Boko Haram Strapped Suicide Bombs to Them. Somehow These Teenage
Girls Survived." New York Times, October 25, 2017.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/25/world/africa/nigeria-boko-haramsuicide-bomb.html
Several young women share first-hand accounts of their ordeals as would-be suicide
bombers for Boko Haram, and how they foiled the acts of terror their captors planned for
them. Boko Haram has increased their use of child bombers, particularly girls, whose
garments can more easily hide explosives. A campaign has launched in Nigeria to let
captured children know they have the option to surrender, but some are too naive or too
terrified and carry out Boko Haram's orders. Terror in the region has led to the deaths of
many children who were suspected of, but ultimately not carrying suicide bombs. Those
who do surrender can face ostracization from people who think of them as part of a Boko
Haram organization for carrying the bombs, regardless of their unwillingness to do so.
Aminu Abubakar. “Suicide Bombing In Nigeria Kills 8.” CNN, November 23, 2015
http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/22/africa/nigeria-violence/
This article discusses a deadly suicide attack in the town of Diwka. The town was
recently liberated from Boko but suicide attacks are still a threat. The victims were
mostly women and children at a military checkpoint.
Delman, Edward. “The World’s Deadliest Terrorist Organization.” Atlantic, November 18, 2015.
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/11/isis-boko-haramterrorism/416673/
This piece looks at the attacks conducted by Boko Haram and how they are responsible
for the deaths of more civilians than ISIS is. The attacks are conducted in neighboring
states and have included mass kidnappings, conventional assaults, bombings, but mostly
suicide bombings. The attack strategies have shifted, whereas previously attacks were
mainly conducted with firearms in previous years, as of 2015 suicide bombings have
increased. The article also expresses concern regarding increased attacks due to Boko
Haram’s allegiance to ISIS.
FOCUS ON SOFT TARGETS

“Boko Haram Plans Attacks on Churches, Mosques, Markets, DSS Warns.” Vanguard,
November 28, 2015.
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http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/11/boko-haram-plans-attacks-on-churches-mosquesmarkets-dss-warns/
This report originally comes from the Department of State Services in Nigeria, warning
residents of Abuja that they had received several reports regarding potential attacks from
Boko Haram targeting places of worship and marketplaces. Letters and text messages
were sent to individuals and different religious leaders warning them of this and provide
numbers residents could call to report anything suspicious.
CLASHES AGAINST NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT

“Boko Haram Overruns Nigerian Military Base in Northeast.” New York Times, October 19,
2016. http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2016/10/19/world/africa/ap-af-nigeria-bokoharam.html?ref=world
Boko Haram members attacked and seized a small military base in northeast
Nigeria. Initial reports state that 13 soldiers were wounded and several are unaccounted
for. A spokesman for the Nigerian army claims that this is a minor setback and operations
are underway to find the missing soldiers and push Boko Haram out of the base. This is
the third attack in the month of October on a military target. The assailants are suspected
to be a splinter group of Boko Haram that calls itself the “West Africa Province of the
Islamic State.”
ATTACKS IN CHAD
"Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond Military Measures." International Crisis Group. March
8, 2017. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/246-fighting-boko-haramchad-beyond-military-measures.
Violence by Boko Haram has displaced hundreds of thousands of people in Chad,
exacerbating conflicts between its traditionally migratory communities. Vigilantes have
played a role in fighting Boko Haram, but a return to state control and influence is
necessary to build cooperation with neighboring countries and take measures to counter
extremists. Among other actions, the Chadian government must find effective, humane
ways of screening and dealing with suspected Boko Haram members it has taken
prisoner; improve communication between itself and its populace; and propose a longterm development for the Lake region that will grow its economy.
“Responsibility for Latest Kano Bombing.” NAIJ, November 29, 2015.
https://www.naij.com/650930-boko-haram-claims-responsibility-recent-kano-bombingissues-fresh-threat.html
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Boko Haram released a message claiming the attack made on a religious procession of
Shiite Muslims near Kano. They threatened to continue these attacks until they have
killed all Shiites.
“Boko Haram: State of Emergency Declared around Lake Chad.” BBC, November 9, 2015.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34771128
Enhance government powers were put into place in order to control the movement of
people and vehicles, in response to Boko Haram attacks. There have been several attacks
in areas around Lake Chad and other areas. Chad may be a continued target due to its
hosting the regional force established to fight Boko Haram.
“Boko Haram Suicide Bombing Kills two in Chad.” News 24, November 8, 2015.
http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/boko-haram-suicide-bombing-kills-two-in-chadsecurity-source-20151108-4
This article discusses one of the most recent Boko suicide attacks in Chad. 2 Chadians
were killed in the attack. Boko, once again, used women suicide bombers.
“Boko Haram Kills 11 Chadian soldiers.” Vanguard, October 6, 2015.
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/10/boko-haram-kills-11-chadian-soldiers/
In a major cross border attack, Boko haram fighters attacked and killed 11 Chadian
soldiers. The Chadian soldiers had taken up positions just one mile from the NigeriaChad border.
“Chad Suicide Bomber Kills 15 People in Market and Injures 80.” Guardian, July 11, 2015.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/11/chad-suicide-bomber-ndjamena-market
This article describes a major Boko attack in N'djamena where an alleged Boko operative
dressed in a Burka and blew himself up. In response to attacks such as this, Chad
eventually banned the use of Burkas in some areas. The attack killed 15 people and
injured 80 others.
NIGER
“Boko Haram Fighters Kill two Niger Soldiers, Wound Four in Ambush.” Reuters, October
2, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/02/us-niger-violenceidUSKCN0RW1MD20151002
This article points out how Boko fighters killed 2 Niger soldiers in a cross border attack.
As of October, 2015, the Diffa region in Niger witnessed 57 attacks. The government has
placed Diffa in a state of emergency due to the attacks.
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CAMEROON
De Marie Heungoup, Hans. "Boko Haram’s Shifting Tactics in Cameroon: What Does the Data
Tell Us?" Africa Research Institute. February 14, 2017.
https://www.africaresearchinstitute.org/newsite/blog/boko-harams-shifting-tacticscameroon-data-tell-us/.
The article uses statistical analysis and large-n data to find trends in the activities of Boko
Haram in Cameroon. The report found that due to losses suffered by Boko Haram in
2016, the group was unable to maintain its operational tempo from 2015. A lull in Boko
Haram recruitment, and an inability to maintain supply lines has hindered their
sustainment and weakened the capacity of the group to wage conventional warfare
capabilities. Since 2015, the group has primarily resorted to asymmetric and hybrid
warfare to keep pressure on the government and dissident vigilante groups and
communities.
Chimtom, Ngala Killian. “11 Killed in two Boko Haram Attacks in Cameroon.” CNN, November
29, 2015. http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/29/africa/cameroon-boko-haram-attacks/
An attack conducted by Boko Haram in northern Cameroon killed 11 people. It is
reported that two female suicide bombers attacked a military base near the Nigerian
border and then conducted a separate attack on the village of Gouzoudou. Northern
Cameron was victim to a Boko Haram attack the previous week and the article states that
in 2014 alone, 6,644 people were killed by Boko Haram.
“Deadly Suicide Attack Rocks Northern Cameroon.” Al Jazeera, November 22, 2015.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/deadly-suicide-attack-rocks-northern-cameroon151121133652103.html
This article discusses one of Boko’s latest attacks against Cameroon where five suicide
bombers attacked various targets in northern Cameroon. The attackers were female
suicide bombers, a hallmark of Boko Haram. At least 12 people have been killed. The
Boko insurgency has killed 20,000 people and displace more than 2 million.
Chimtom, Nagala., and Greg Botelho. “Boko Haram Crosses Border, Kills about 30 in Northern
Cameroon.” CNN, September 3, 2015.
http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/03/africa/boko-haram-cameroon-violence/
This article describes a major Boko attack in Cameroon that killed 30 people and injured
145 others. The attack took place in the northern Cameroonian town of Kerawa. The
article also cites a government official as saying that Boko’s tactic is now to target
civilians in quick raids instead of engaging troops.
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Laccino, Ludovica. “Five killed in Suspected Boko Haram Attack near Border with Nigeria.”
International Business Times, August 13, 2015.
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/cameroon-five-killed-suspected-boko-haram-attack-nearborder-nigeria-1515302
This article describes Cameroon's struggle with Boko. It points out that Boko killed five
people in Cameroon in retaliation for an operation against Boko. The government also
announced that it would bolster troop presence in the northern parts of the country.
USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS
Ghedi Santur, Hassan. "Surviving Al-Shabab: The Boy Who Escaped the World's Most
Ruthless Terror Group." Pulitzer Center. July 28, 2018.
http://www.pulitzercenter.org/reporting/surviving-al-shabab-boy-who-escaped-worldsmost-ruthless-terror-group.
Surviving al-Shabab: The Boy Who Escaped the World's Most Ruthless Terror
Group:Abdi, a former child soldier of al-Shabaab, talks about his experience as an al
Qaeda-affiliated militant in Somalia and the treatment he received at the hands of the
group. For al-Shabaab, child soldiers are useful because they are impressionable, easy to
manipulate, and disposable on the front lines. In 2017 the group recruited 1,770 child
soldiers.
Hinshaw, Drew., and Joe Parkinson. “The 10,000 Kidnapped Boys of Boko Haram.” Wall Street
Journal, August 12, 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-kidnapped-boys-of-bokoharam-1471013062
This article cover the abduction and brainwashing of close to 10,000 boys by Boko
Haram with the end goal of using them as fighters and suicide bombers. The information
comes from the Nigerian and Cameroonian governments, Human Rights Watch, and
children who escaped from Boko Haram. Boys are kidnapped, beaten and trained to use
weapons. They are often thrown against government forces with few weapons and
drugged on opiates. Those who escape are either too scared to go home, are afraid of
endangering their families or of being captured by the government. Many are also forced
to live in hiding due to the continuous threat of Boko Haram and the local populace
labeling them as spies for the group.
AFFILIATIONS
AQ-ISIL-BOKO

Zimmerman, Malia. “Terror Triumvirate: ISIS, Al Qaeda, Boko Haram Training Together in
Mauritania: Analyst.” Fox News, March 23, 2015.
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http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/03/24/terror-triumvirate-isis-al-qaeda-boko-haramtraining-together-in-mauritania/
This article points out how Boko, AQ, and ISIL recruits are training together in two
training camps in Mauritania. It provides various forms of evidence that fighters
belonging to AQIM are training Boko Haram fighters and ISIL supporters in camps in
Mauritania. The article also states that Boko relies on AQ in Mauritania for weapons
supply lines.
ISIL AFFILIATION

Brigaglia, Andrea. “Slicing off the Tumour”: The History of Global Jihad in Nigeria, as
Narrated by the Islamic State." Center for Contemporary Islam 1 (August 2018): 1-17.
http://www.cci.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/146/Slicing off the
Tumour.pdf.
Analyzes the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) document ‘Slicing Off the
Tumour’ – a response to Shekau’s extremist policies and practices as part of the Boko
Haram leadership in Nigeria. The piece takes a harder stance against Shekau, in contrast
to a 2011 document from AQIM written during a time of Boko Haram-al-Qaeda
affiliation, which speaks on Shekau’s policies in a more diplomatic manner (See: AQIM
Advice to 'Boko Haram' Dissidents: Full Translation and Analysis). The authors consider
the question of Boko Haram’s existence as a result of local structural issues versus the
result of global jihadi influence.
“ISIL ‘Accepts Boko Haram's Pledge of Allegiance’.” Al Jazeera, March 12, 2015.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/03/isil-accepts-boko-haram-pledge-allegiance150312201038730.html
This article points out that ISIL formally accepted Boko’s pledge of allegiance. The
acceptance was posted on pro-ISIL websites and was not able to be immediately verified.
Oladipo, Tomi “Islamic State ties broaden Boko Haram threat.” BBC, October 2, 2015.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34412956
While the Nigerian military may defeat Boko soon, its ties to ISIL may cause some of its
fighters to foray into neighboring states as they may continue to be motivated to carry out
jihad by ISIL. The article also provides other analysis on the group.
AQ AFFILIATION

"AQIM Advice to 'Boko Haram' Dissidents: Full Translation and Analysis." Aymenn Jawad AlTamimi. September 15, 2018. http://www.aymennjawad.org/21618/aqim-advice-to-bokoharam-dissidents-full.
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Provides a full translation of a text written by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
to advise Boko Haram dissidents skeptical of Abu Bakr Shekau’s extremist policies. The
main body of the text (excluding the 2017 introduction) was written at a time when Boko
Haram affiliated itself with al-Qaeda, and the document attempts to reconcile Shekau’s
methodologies with al Qaeda’s practices. The translator provides analysis in the context
of a recent debate between Boko Haram scholars that argues the importance taking into
account primary and secondary source materials together to piece together a more
complete narrative. With that in mind, the author suggests the introduction is equally
important as the main text, coming from an al Qaeda operative six years after the original
text was written. Both offer insights into the history of Boko Haram.
Zenn, Jacob, "The Al-Qaeda Accelerant in Boko Haram’s Rise" (2017). CIWAG Case Studies.
3. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ciwag-case-studies/3
The Al-Qaeda Accelerant in Boko Haram’s Rise, maps the group’s many factions,
loyalties, splintering, and re-formations. It provides insight into the seams and gaps that
exist, and how strategic and tactical motivations have propelled an armed group to
regional importance. The study dissects how the group’s evolution has taken place under
the watchful eye, and often directing hand, of both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq
and al-Sham and highlights its starring role in a new international rivalry: the uncivil war
between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.
Simcox, Robin. “Boko Haram and defining the 'al-Qaeda network'.” Al Jazeera, June 6, 2014.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/06/boko-haram-al-qaeda201463115816142554.html
This article from 2014 discusses Al Qaeda’s links to Boko. It points out that as far back
as 2002 Bin Laden began developing connections to Salafi groups in West Africa,
including what would become Boko Haram. It provides various interactions of Boko and
AQ throughout the years.

Counterterrorism
NIGERIAN EFFORTS
"Nigeria and Counter-Terrorism Efforts." C-SPAN. May 2, 2018.
https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4727734/nigeria-counter-terrorism-efforts.
Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari discusses his nation’s recent efforts to tackle
their growing problem of Islamist extremism. He referenced his nation’s partnership with
the U.S. and neighbors to counter extremist rhetoric and develop rehabilitation programs
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to reintegrate former members of Boko Haram into the general population. He also
touched on the negotiated release of schoolgirls captured by Boko Haram, and new
programs established to reintegrate former members of Boko Haram back into society.
“Nigerian Air Force Bombs ‘Mass Gathering’ of Boko Haram Terrorists.” Premium Times,
November 19, 2015.
http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/193485-nigerian-air-force-bombsmass-gathering-of-boko-haram-terrorists.html
The Nigerian Air Force (NAF) announced that they conducted an airstrike on what was
described as a “mass gathering” of Boko Haram members in Borno State. In addition to
this, NAF representatives stated that they destroyed a weapons storage area, a bombmaking factory, vehicle workshop, and several vehicles as well. The air campaign has
continued to play an increasing role in the fight against Boko Haram.
Searcey, Dionne. “Boko Haram Attacks Persist, But Nigerian Officials Say Group Is Losing
Ground.” New York Times, November 15, 2015.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/16/world/africa/boko-haram-attacks-persist-butnigerian-officials-say-group-is-losing-ground.html?_r=0
Although Boko Haram has been steadily losing ground, it continues to carry out high
profile bombing attacks throughout the region. The military push into Boko strongholds
is causing its fighters to disperse and rely more on suicide bombings. The group generally
uses women as suicide bombers.
“Boko Haram 'Most Wanted' Poster Yields First Arrest.” Yahoo News/AFP, November 9, 2015.
http://news.yahoo.com/boko-haram-most-wanted-poster-yields-first-arrest085221866.html
The Nigerian government recently released a poster for the top 100 most wanted Boko
terrorists. The poster resulted in the arrest of Chindo Bello. He was boarding a flight at
Abuja airport when police arrested him after a tip off.
Campbell, John. “Claims of Nigerian Military Success against Boko Haram.” Africa in
Transition. Council on Foreign Relations. September 15, 2015.
http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2015/09/15/claims-of-nigerian-military-success-againstboko-haram/
This article by CFR describes how Boko has steadily been losing territory. However, it
says that while they lose territory, Boko has been able to show flexibility in
unconventional tactics. It points out that the group has increased its use of suicide
bombers and other unconventional tactics following its loss of territory.
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Bajekal, Naina. “How Nigeria is bringing the Fight to Boko Haram.” Time, July 23, 2015.
http://time.com/3969252/how-nigeria-is-bringing-the-fight-to-boko-haram/
This brief article quickly describes how President Buhari is aiming to define a clear goal
against Boko Haram. It briefly describes changes made by the top leadership of the
armed forces, creating a coalition, and growing the economy.
“The War Against Boko Haram (Full Length).” YouTube Video. 29:52. Posted by “Vice News.”
April 13, 2015.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1kimbo5c0Ak
This is a documentary by Vice News that observes the Nigerian Army’s efforts to counter
Boko Haram. A reporter is embedded with a Nigerian unit battling for control over
Konduga. It also shows interviews with Nigerian troops and their views on fighting Boko
Haram.
REGIONAL GOVERNMENT CLAIMS SUCCESS

Allen, Nathaniel. “Charting Boko Haram’s Rapid Decline.” War on the Rocks, September
22, 2016. http://warontherocks.com/2016/09/charting-boko-harams-rapid-decline/
Four main factors have influenced Boko Haram’s decrease in attacks: failure to expand
its territory, loss of popular support, poor strategic thinking, and improved
counterinsurgency operations. However, the war against Boko Haram will require more
effective regional counterinsurgency coordination to end this conflict.
Butty, James. “Nigeria Army Chief: Boko Haram Capabilities ‘Virtually Eliminated.’” VOA,
September 16, 2016. http://www.voanews.com/a/nigeria-army-chief-boko-haramcapabilities-virtually-eliminated/3511656.html
Lieutenant General Tukur Buratai of the Nigerian army stated that Boko Haram has been
greatly diminished and has lost its former mobility. According to Buratai, the group’s
capabilities have been reduced and all media purporting their numbers and abilities are
solely propaganda.
TACTICS OF NIGERIAN LAND FORCES

Dixon, Robyn. “Nigeria’s Military Accused of 8,000 Deaths in Fight against Boko Haram.” LA
Times, June 3, 2015
http://www.latimes.com/world/africa/la-fg-nigeria-military-abuses-20150603story.html#page=1
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This article examines a report by Amnesty International which documents the
extrajudicial executions and mistreatment during detention of civilians by Nigerian
security forces and allied militiamen. The Nigerian government is under constant
criticism for not adequately carrying out its counterinsurgency campaign.
Nossiter, Adam. “Nigerian Army Noticeably Absent in Town Taken From Boko Haram.” New
York Times, March 20, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/21/world/africa/nigerianarmy-noticeably-absent-in-town-taken-from-boko-haram.html
This article discusses the increasing role of Niger and Chad in the regional fight against
Boko Haram, as its forces liberate areas within Nigeria without the presence of the
Nigerian security forces. The lack of Nigerian troops after the liberation of insurgent
strongholds portrays the Nigerian government as an unwilling partner in the
counterinsurgency campaign.
“Terror Tears through Nigeria: Hunting Boko Haram (Part 1).” YouTube Video. 12:30. Posted
by “Frontline PBS.” September 9, 2014.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nn4pkAxgaKo
This is a video documentary by Frontline PBS that discusses the fighting against Boko
Haram by the military and pro-govt Muslim militias. It conducts various interviews
regarding the militias and provides information that shows them as very useful in fighting
Boko. It also contains evidence of atrocities committed by the militias and how these
atrocities lead to more people joining Boko.
“Inside a Nigerian Death House: Hunting Boko Haram (Part 2).” YouTube Video. 9:39. Posted
by “Frontline PBS.” September 9, 2014.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uQruyXRGgzQ
This is another Frontline PBS video that points out the heavy handed tactics used by the
Nigerian military. It points out how the military falsely accuses people of being involved
with Boko.
ANALYSIS OF CT CAMPAIGN

Felbab-Brown, Vanda. "Nigeria's Troubling Counterinsurgency Strategy Against Boko Haram:
How the MIlitary and Militias Are Fueling Insecurity." Foreign Affairs, March 30, 2018.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/nigeria/2018-03-30/nigerias-troublingcounterinsurgency-strategy-against-boko-haram.
In order to counter Boko Haram in Nigeria, the state has adopted a number of policies
and practices that allow its military to harass and ultimately alienate its population. The
military is used to round up and detain civilians and kill them without due process. These
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practices are enough to drive people into the arms of radical groups like Boko Haram to
escape harassment. The article suggests that in order to salvage the relationship between
the state and its people, the counterinsurgency strategy must shift to adhere to current
human rights norms, the Nigerian military must be held accountable for its actions, and a
dialogue must be opened between the public and the leadership.
Bappah, Habibu Yaya. “Nigeria’s Military Failure against the Boko Haram Insurgency.” African
Security Review 25, no. 2 (June 2016): 146-158.
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=114820063&site=ehost
-live
This article evaluates the causes behind the limited impact of the Nigerian military on
Boko Haram expansion. No serious progress was made on countering the group until
troops from Niger and Chad became involved in the campaign. The failings of the
counterterrorism actions against Boko Haram (until outside intervention) are attributed by
the author to poor military and civilian leadership along with failing military
professionalism.
Falode, James Adewumi. “The Nature of Nigeria’s Boko Haram War, 2010-2015: A Strategic
Analysis.” Perspectives on Terrorism 10, no. 1 (January, 2016): 41-52.
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=113482987&site=ehost
-live
The author of this article seeks to evaluate the impact, effectiveness, and consequences of
Nigeria’s counterterrorism campaign against Boko Haram. Nigeria is no stranger to
conducting operations against non-state actors and has been with few breaks since its
independence in 1960. The author looks at the origins, tactics and strategy of Boko
Haram and applies the three sub-types of hybrid warfare (fourth generation warfare,
compound wars and unrestricted warfare) to the different phases of the conflict between
Nigeria and Boko Haram. This conflict has not been solely relegated to Nigeria. Chad,
Niger and other neighboring countries have been attacked by and are involved in the fight
against Boko Haram. The author concludes that Nigeria’s initial response was lacking
and allowed for the expansion of Boko Haram. Corruption and limited training plaguing
the Nigerian military along with a misinterpretation of the conflict by the
government. Outside training and military aid have been essential in the fight against
Boko Haram.
Ngwodo, Chris. “Unending Counter-Terrorism War.” All Africa/Premium Times, October 22,
2015.
http://allafrica.com/stories/201510220248.html
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This is an analysis piece on Nigeria’s efforts against Boko. The author provides various
suggestions for the security forces to become better at combating the group.
POTENTIAL NEGOTIATIONS

Victor, Phillip. “Nigeria's Buhari Open to Negotiations with Boko Haram for Kidnapped Girls.”
Al Jazeera, October 16, 2015
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/10/16/nigeria-open-to-negotiations-with-bokoharam.html
This article points out that President Buhari might be open to enter negotiations for the
kidnapped Chibok schoolgirls. The article cites President Buhari as saying that if Boko
can prove the girls are alive, they are willing to enter negotiations.
REGIONAL E FFORTS/AU
COALITION

Zamfir, Ionel. "Regional Efforts to Fight Boko Haram." European Parliament Research Service.
February 2017.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/599274/EPRS_ATA(2017)5
99274_EN.pdf.
This short briefing from the European Parliament Research Service outlines the efforts
being under taken by the Multinational Joint Task Force to counter the cross-border
threat of Boko haram in the Lake Chad basin which has created a humanitarian disaster in
the region.
“African Coalition Prepares for Boko Haram Offensive.” Al Jazeera, February 19, 2015.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2015/02/african-coalition-prepares-boko-haramoffensive-150219123427799.html
This article points out how a regional task force has been set up between Chad,
Cameroon, Niger, Benin and Nigeria. The task force is being designed for offensive
operations against Boko Haram on Nigerian soil. As of February, 2015 the 8,700 strong
taskforce’s strategy had not been finalized.
CREATION OF THE FORCE

Dorrie, Peter. “The African Union Readies an Army to Fight Boko Haram.” War is Boring,
January 30, 2015.
https://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-african-union-readies-an-army-to-beat-bokoharam-694150ba6ebb#.y0y3h6r1h
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This is another article discussing the AU Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko. It
points out that Chad may be the most valuable partner in the Task Force. Chadian troops
are said to be highly experienced in counter-insurgency.

LEADERSHIP

Winsor, Morgan. “Boko Haram Regional Fight: Nigerian Commander to Lead Coalition Force.”
International Business Times, July 30, 2015.
http://www.ibtimes.com/boko-haram-regional-fight-nigerian-commander-lead-coalitionforce-2031569
This article points out how a Nigerian commander will head the taskforce against Boko.
It also states that the taskforce will be stationed out of N'djamena, Chad. It also points out
that Nigeria accused Cameroon of not doing enough to destroy Boko safe havens on its
side of the border.
REGIONAL ACCESS

“Anti-Boko Haram force 'to Cross Borders to Fight'.” BBC, July 29, 2015.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33702738
This article points out that the regional governments working against Boko have
developed more trust amongst each other. The regional force will now be able to cross
borders between these states as a result of this developing trust. It also points out that
Boko has lost many of its strongholds but is turning more to suicide bombings.
CHAD
COUNTERTERRORISM

“Chad's Fight against Boko Haram.” YouTube Video. 9:53. Posted by “Vice News.” July 8,
2015.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YsyM6p2hNqE
This video details the Chadian fight against Boko Haram. It points out that Boko Haram
fighters cross Lake Chad and attack various villages. It says how lakeside residents in
Chad have been kidnapped and killed, prompting a Chadian military response. The video
follows a Chadian unit that has been deployed to the Cameroon-Nigeria border area to
prevent Boko infiltration.
Allison, Simon. “Chad Rides to the Rescue in Nigeria, but which Chad?” Institute for Security
Studies, January 27, 2015.
https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/think-again-chad-rides-to-the-rescue-in-nigeria-butwhich-chad
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This article points out that the Chadian military is highly experienced in counterinsurgency warfare. However, the article also points out some issues the Chadian military
may have. It states that the Chadian military performed extremely well against Islamists
in Mali. However, during deployments to CAR the Chadian military was hit with many
human rights violations and was even accused of allowing the Seleka rebels to roam free.
Chad had agreed to deploy 2,000 troops to fight Boko.
ARRESTS BY CHAD CT FORCES

“Chad Forces Arrest Boko Haram leader, Hold 74 Others.” Associated Press, July 1, 2015.
http://www.aol.com/article/2015/07/01/chad-forces-arrest-boko-haram-leader-hold-74others/21203991/
This article points out that a Boko leader, Bahna Fanaye, was arrested by Chadian
security forces. It says that Fanaye was coordinating weapons transfers between Nigeria,
Chad, and Cameroon. A further 74 other Boko suspects were also arrested.
Laccino, Ludovica. “Boko Haram: Chad to Arrest Foreigners in Terrorism Crackdown
Following N'Djamena attack.” International Business Times, June 22, 2015.
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/boko-haram-chad-arrest-foreigners-terrorism-crackdownfollowing-ndjamena-attack-1507312
This article points out how Chad responded by rounding up many foreigners after twin
bombings blamed on Boko. Chad also banned face veils for women, arguing that it
allows attackers to “camouflage” themselves.
WESTERN EFFORTS
FRANCE

“France to Boost Regional Forces Battling Boko Haram.” Al Jazeera, March 12, 2015.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/03/france-boost-regional-forces-battling-bokoharam-150312092800288.html
This article discusses France’s increasing role in the fight against Boko Haram.
REQUEST FOR U.S. TROOPS

Hinshaw, Drew and Neanda Salvateera. “Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan Wants U.S.
Troops to Fight Boko Haram.” Wall Street Journal, February 13, 2015.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/nigerian-president-wants-u-s-troops-to-fight-boko-haram1423850893
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This article points out that Nigeria’s previous president, Goodluck Jonathan, wanted U.S.
troops to get involved against Boko Haram. He claims that Boko Haram has connections
to ISIL. The article points out that former President Jonathan requested combat troops
and advisors.
U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS

Cole, Beth E., Alexa Courtney, Erica Kaster, and Noah Sheinbaum. "Breaking Boko Haram and
Ramping Up Recovery: US Engagement in the Lake Chad Region 2013 to 2016." United
States Institute of Peace. 2017. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/3D-Lessons-CaseLake-Chad-Region.pdf.
This case study explores U.S. assistance in the Lake Chad region to demonstrate the
effectiveness of defense, development, and diplomatic missions on states in crisis. The
report is intended to educate policy members on the methodologies for supporting at risk
states. Due to the complex nature of the Lake Chad Basin’s Boko Haram insurgency and
other regional militant organizations, the report focuses heavily on how the “3Ds”
(defense, development, and diplomacy) can be wielded to combat various threats and
better enable local stability operations.
“US Troops Deployed to Cameroon for Boko Haram fight.” Al Jazeera, October 14, 2015.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/10/usa-troops-deployed-cameroon-boko-haramfight-151014212428195.html
This article points out that U.S. troops have begun deploying to Cameroon to support the
regional fight against Boko. 90 troops have already been deployed and an additional 300
will be sent to provide intelligence support. The article also cites POTUS as saying that
the troops will remain in country for an indefinite amount of time.
“U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria’s Boko Haram.” Council Special Report No. 27. Council on
Foreign Relations. Center for Preventive Action. November 2014.
http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/us-policy-counter-nigerias-boko-haram/p33806
This CFR special report provides various U.S. policy recommendations to counter the
Boko threat.
LOCAL IMPACT
LIVING IN FEAR

Schlein, Lisa. “Nigerians Freed From Boko Haram Live in Fear, Deprivation.” VOA, October 7,
2016. http://www.voanews.com/a/nigerians-freed-from-boko-haram-live-in-feardeprivation/3541390.html
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Areas formerly controlled by Boko Haram are still suffering despite being liberated. They
are still at risk for new attacks and are facing regular food shortages. Many are living in
old public buildings and makeshift shelters because their hometowns are not safe to go
back to.
“Boko Haram Ghosts Haunt ‘Liberated’ Mubi, Northeast Nigeria.” NBC News, November 3,
2015.
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/boko-haram-ghosts-haunt-liberated-mubi-northeastnigeria-n456391
This article describes the aftermath of living in a town that has been recaptured from
Boko Haram. Everyone is still nervous and cannot go about all aspects of daily life for
fear of another attack or that Boko Haram might be waiting for them outside of
time. Vigilance is important and locals are asked to report anyone who does not belong
to their town or village.
Egbejule, Eromo. “Everyday Insurgency: Nigerians Describe Life in the Time of Boko Haram.”
Guardian, November 9, 2015.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/09/nigeria-stories-life-in-the-time-of-bokoharam
This article features firsthand accounts from individuals who survived Boko Haram
attacks. The attacks have become so frequent and have caused so much damage that the
residents do not have time to mourn and recover. Since so many businesses have been
lost and families impacted, trading and stores open up just a day or two after the attacks
because the inhabitants still need to buy food and go to work. In addition to the loss of
life, many people are losing jobs due to lost business or are let go due to the expenses of
operating in the area.
For additional individual accounts, and the difficulties faced as a refugee, see:
Vinograd, Cassandra., David Lom, and Keir Simmons. “Boko Haram Massacre Survivors
Flee Nigeria to Island in Lake Chad.” NBC News.
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/missing-nigeria-schoolgirls/boko-haram-massacresurvivors-flee-nigeria-island-lake-chad-n367571
DESTRUCTION OF SCHOOLS

“Boko Haram Destroyed More Than 1,000 Schools This Year.” Al Jazeera, November 16, 2015.
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/11/16/boko-haram-destroyed-more-than-1000schools-this-year-un.html
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This article points out that Boko destroyed 1,000 schools in 2015. The group’s name
means “Western Education is forbidden.”
SOCIAL MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA

Zenn, Jacob. "Electronic Jihad in Nigeria: How Boko Haram Is Using Social Media." Jamestown
Foundation. December 09, 2017. https://jamestown.org/program/electronic-jihad-nigeriaboko-haram-using-social-media/.
Social media sites are rapidly becoming more frequently used by extremist groups to
release propaganda messaging, and although Boko Haram was slow to adopt digital
media, they now have a robust social media presence. The organization is outperforming
its local rival Ansaru by posting videos on Facebook and Telegram, and using
sympathetic media outlets to distribute its message and enhance its recruiting efforts.
“Is Islamic State Shaping Boko Haram Media?” BBC, March 4, 2015.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31522469
This article analyzes the similarities in propaganda between Boko and ISIL. It points out
how pro-ISIL online operatives started promoting Boko’s newly launched Al-Urwah AlWuthqa. The article observes various similarities including the increasing sophistication
of Boko’s online media.
COMPETING JIHADI GROUPS
ANSARU

Joscelyn, Thomas. “Jihadist Divisions Grow in Nigeria.” Long War Journal, February 23, 2015.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/02/jihadist-divisions-grow-in-nigeria.php
This article points out how an emerging Jihadi group, Ansaru, is enemies with Boko
Haram. It describes Ansaru as an Islamic terrorist outfit; however, it is fighting against
Boko Haram because the latter is attacking Muslims in addition to Christians. Ansaru
seeks to only target Christians.
Chothia, Farouk. “Profile: Who are Nigeria's Ansaru Islamists?” BBC, March 11, 2013.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21510767
This link is a profile of the Ansaru Islamists. It points out that the group is motivated on a
radical Islamist ideology and has the stated goal of “defending Muslims in Africa.” It also
wants to bring Islamist law to all of Nigeria. Ansaru is said to be an offshoot of Boko
Haram. Ansaru’s followers believe that Boko Haram is inhumane as it brutally attacks
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Muslims as well as non-Muslims. Ansaru tries to portray itself as a more rational and less
brutal alternative to Boko as it does not believe in killing innocent people.
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